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In this note we consider a general equilibrium model with oligopolistic competition between
firms who ignore the feedback effect of their dividend payments on demand. The outcome of
this competition coincides with the perfectly competitive equilibrium solution, provided that
firms have identical production technologies.
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The concept of a Cournot–Walras equilibrium has been introduced by Gab-
szewicz and Vial (1972) to describe oligopolistic interaction between ﬁrms in
a general equilibrium setting. Firms decide production plans, knowing the ob-
jective inverse demand curve which captures the competitive demand behavior
of their consumers, and which also takes into account the feedback eﬀect of
ﬁrms’ dividend payments on consumers’ wealth.
The objective demand approach imposes strong informational assumptions on
oligopolists. For this reason, some authors proposed general equilibrium mod-
els with imperfect competition assuming that ﬁrms do not take into account
the feedback eﬀect of their dividend payments on demand (see Marschak and
Selten 1974, Silvestre 1977 and Hart 1985). Such an assumption seems reason-
able in an economy consisting of a large number of sectors (islands) in which
producers and consumers trade on only one island, but in which consumers
hold proﬁt shares in ﬁrms on other islands. Such an “island economy” has
been introduced by Hart (1985) who formulates a general equilibrium model
of price competition in which there is no proﬁt feedback. Implicitly, also most
of the macroeconomic literature with oligopolistic or monopolistic competi-
tion uses the assumption that ﬁrms ignore the proﬁt feedback on demand (see
e.g. Blanchard and Kiyotaki 1987 and Hart 1982).
This note considers a modiﬁcation of the Cournot–Walras equilibrium concept
of Gabszewicz and Vial (1972) in which ﬁrms are ignorant of the proﬁt feed-
back. Unlike the original Cournot–Walras equilibrium whose outcome depends
critically on the choice of the price normalization rule (see B¨ ohm 1994 and
Grodal 1996), this equilibrium concept is independent of price normalization.
More surprisingly, our equilibrium concept gives rise to a Bertrand–like result:
competition between ﬁrms with identical technology sets leads to the perfectly
competitive solution. Using two examples, we illustrate that our modiﬁed
Cournot–Walras equilibrium diﬀers from the original Cournot–Walras equilib-
rium (for several standard price normalization rules). It typically also diﬀers
from the competitive equilibrium, when ﬁrms have non–identical technologies.
2 The economy
Description of the model




1with the usual interpretation: I and J are the sets of consumers and ﬁrms
with typical elements i and j, respectively, and cardinalities of these sets are
also denoted I and J. There are L commodities. Consumer i 2 I is described
by a utility function ui deﬁned over his consumption set Xi (here assumed to
be IR
L
+), and his vector of initial endowments !i 2 IR
L. Firms j 2 J choose
production plans yj out of their production sets Yj ½ IR
L. ±ij is i’s share of
the proﬁts of ﬁrm j.
Let p 2 IR
L
++ denote a price vector. If ﬁrms choose production plans (yj)j2J,
the proﬁt income of consumer i is denoted ¼i =
P
j2J ±ijpyj. Unlike Gabszewicz
and Vial (1972), we assume that ﬁrms take the proﬁt incomes of their con-
sumers ¼ = (¼i)i2I as given. This assumption can be justiﬁed in an economy
consisting of a large number of islands in which consumers and producers trade
on only one island, but in which consumers hold proﬁt shares in ﬁrms on other
islands. When the number of islands is large and proﬁt shares are suﬃciently
distributed, these indirect proﬁt feedbacks are small, and it is therefore rea-
sonable that ﬁrms ignore these eﬀects (see Hart 1985). For ease of exposition,
we do not formulate such an island economy explicitly, but we simply assume
that ﬁrms take proﬁt incomes as given when they decide on production plans.
The objective inverse demand
Assume that utility functions are continuous, strictly quasi–concave, strictly
monotone, and twice diﬀerentiable. Then the solution of consumer i’s utility
maximization problem is described by the Walrasian demand function xi(p;wi)
which fulﬁlls p ¢ xi(p;wi) = wi for all price/income–pairs (p;wi). Consumers’






xi(p;p!i + ¼i) ¡ !i
´
;





Given production plans of ﬁrms, y = (yj)j2J, and the vector of proﬁt incomes
¼, a market clearing price vector p fulﬁlls




Let W(¯ y;¼) denote the set of market clearing price vectors. Under the as-
sumption Yj ½ IR
L
+ which is also imposed by Gabszewicz and Vial (1972), this
set is non–empty for all non–zero production plans:
Lemma: If
P
i2I !i À 0 and Yj ½ IR
L
+ for all j 2 J, then W(¯ y;¼) 6= ; for all
¯ y 2
P
j2J Yj n f0g and ¼ 2 IR
I
+ nf0g.
Proof: Take any ¯ y ¸ 0, ¯ y 6= 0, and any ¼ ¸ 0, ¼ 6= 0, and consider the
associated pure exchange economy with endowments ˜ !i = !i + (¼i=¯ ¼)¯ y where
2¯ ¼ ´
P
i2I ¼i > 0. Since
P
i2I ˜ !i À 0, it has a Walrasian equilibrium price
vector p 2 IR
L




xi(p;p!i + (¼i=¯ ¼)p¯ y) ¡ !i
´
= ¯ y :
Since this equation is homogenous of degree zero in p and since ¯ ¼ > 0 and
¯ y 6= 0, p can be normalized such that p¯ y = ¯ ¼. Hence, z(p;¼) = ¯ y. 2
A few remarks are in order. First, the set of market clearing price vectors may
be multi–valued, as a pure–exchange economy may have multiple equilibrium
price vectors. We denote a selection of this set by P(¯ y;¼) which, in general,
need not be a continuous function. P(:;¼) is the “objective” inverse demand
function against which ﬁrms who ignore the proﬁt feedback play a Cournot
game. Second, since the correspondence W(¯ y;¼) is homogeneous of degree one
in ¼ 2 IR
I
+, we assume that also the selection P(¯ y;¼) is homogeneous of degree
one in ¼ (which is, of course, only an assumption when there are multiple
equilibrium price vectors). Third, we may restrict price selections to those
which have discontinuities only at critical points (¯ y;¼) of the projection of the
graph of W(:;:) onto IR
L £IR
I (similar to Dierker and Grodal 1986, p. 170).
If (¯ y;¼) is a regular point of this projection, the objective inverse demand P








+ is a Cournot–Walras equilib-
rium without proﬁt feedback if
(i) y¤
j 2 argmaxyj2Yj P(yj +
P
k6=j y¤
k;¼¤)yj 8 j 2 J ;





j 8 i 2 I :
Note that a Cournot–Walras equilibrium without proﬁt feedback is indepen-
dent of price (and proﬁt) normalization: If (y¤;p¤;¼¤) is an equilibrium, then
(y¤;¸p¤;¸¼¤) is also an equilibrium for any ¸ > 0, since P(¯ y;:) is linearly
homogeneous. The determination of absolute prices plays no role in our equi-
librium concept, as it is the case in a competitive equilibrium. It contrasts
however to Gabszewicz and Vial’s concept of a Cournot–Walras equilibrium
(with proﬁt feedback) where the determination of absolute prices (the normal-
ization rule) aﬀects the equilibrium allocation. In fact, Grodal (1996) shows
that any arbitrary production plan can generally be obtained as an equilib-
rium by a suitable choice of price normalization. This dependence on price
3normalization is sometimes attributed to the hypothesis of proﬁt maximiza-
tion which needs not be in the interest of ﬁrms’ shareholders. In contrast, in
the interpretation of our economy as an island economy, proﬁt maximization
would be in the interest of shareholders (who trade only with ﬁrms on other
islands). We return to the normalization issue in the examples below.
From the deﬁnition of the inverse demand function P and the budget con-
straints of consumers follows that the sum of ﬁrms’ proﬁts is independent of
production plans and equals the aggregate proﬁt income of consumers. Indeed,
for all ¼ 2 IR
I
+ and all ¯ y 2
P
j2J Yj we have:










¼i = ¯ ¼ :
The case of a single monopolist (J = 1) turns out to be completely indeter-
minate: For any y 2 Y , (y;P(y;(±i)i2I);(±i)i2I) is an equilibrium since (1)
implies that the monopolist’s proﬁt is constant, whenever the inverse demand
function is deﬁned. If there are more ﬁrms, the situation is diﬀerent however.
(1) then implies that maximization of any ﬁrm’s proﬁt is equivalent to the
minimization of the cumulative proﬁts of all other ﬁrms. A competition with
this feature turns out to be eﬃcient if all ﬁrms have identical technologies.
The following theorem shows that whenever ﬁrms have identical technologies,
a symmetric Cournot–Walras equilibrium without proﬁt feedback is a compet-
itive equilibrium, and vice versa if proﬁt functions are strictly quasi–concave.
A competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as a vector (y¤;p¤;¼¤) which fulﬁlls (ii) and
(iii) in the above deﬁnition, but satisﬁes instead of (i) the proﬁt maximization






¤yj 8 j 2 J :
Theorem: Let J > 1, suppose Yj = Y for all j 2 J where Y ½ IR
L is convex.





j = ˆ y¤ for all j 2 J. Assume that
P(:;¼¤) is continuously diﬀerentiable at Jˆ y¤. Then it follows:
(i) If (y¤;p¤;¼¤) is a Cournot–Walras equilibrium without proﬁt feedback, then
it is a competitive equilibrium.
(ii) If (y¤;p¤;¼¤) is a competitive equilibrium and if the proﬁt function Π(y) =
P(y+(J¡1)ˆ y¤;¼¤)y is strictly quasi–concave, then it is a Cournot–Walras
equilibrium without proﬁt feedback.
4Proof: Deﬁne A := dyP(Jˆ y¤;¼¤) 2 IR
L£L. Then diﬀerentiation of equation









= J(A ¢ Jˆ y
¤ + p
¤) ;
where p¤ = P(Jˆ y¤;¼¤). With Π(y) = P(y + (J ¡ 1)ˆ y¤;¼¤)y, this yields
dΠ(ˆ y
¤) = A ¢ ˆ y
¤ + p
¤ = J ¡ 1
J p
¤ : (2)
If (y¤;p¤;¼¤) is a Cournot–Walras equilibrium without proﬁt feedback, then
ˆ y¤ 2 argmaxy2Y Π(y) and convexity of Y imply dΠ(ˆ y¤)(y ¡ ˆ y¤) · 0 for all
y 2 Y . Using (2) gives p¤ˆ y¤ ¸ p¤y for all y 2 Y , and claim (i) follows.
If (y¤;p¤;¼¤) is a competitive equilibrium, it follows again from (2) and p¤ˆ y¤ ¸
p¤y that dΠ(ˆ y¤)(y ¡ ˆ y¤) · 0 for all y 2 Y . But now strict quasi–concavity of
Π(:) and convexity of Y imply Π(ˆ y¤) ¸ Π(y) for all y 2 Y , and therefore (ii)
follows. 2
Part (ii) in this theorem imposes the strong assumption of strict quasi–concavity
of proﬁt functions. Such an assumption cannot be derived from hypotheses on
fundamentals, but is standard in the literature on general equilibrium with im-
perfect competition to guarantee existence of equilibrium (see e.g. Hart 1985).
Note however, that part (i) does not need this assumption. That is, whenever a
Cournot–Walras equilibrium exists it must be a competitive equilibrium (pro-
vided that ﬁrms have identical technologies).
4 Two examples
We now provide two examples that illustrate the theorem and compare our
equilibrium concept to the one of Gabszewicz and Vial. The ﬁrst is a sim-
ple “Robinson Crusoe” economy in which ﬁrms have identical technologies.
The second example shows that the theorem does not extend to competition
between ﬁrms with diﬀerent technologies.
Example 1: Consider an economy with two commodities (output good and
labor), 2 ﬁrms and one consumer. Firms have identical technology sets
Yj =
n
(yj;¡`j) j 0 · yj = `j · 1
o
; j = 1;2 :
The consumer has an endowment of ¯ ` > 2 units of labor and zero endowment
of the output good, and his utility function is ln(y) + ³`, ³ < 1=2, where
(y;`) denotes consumption of the output good and leisure. Utility maximiza-
tion implies that the real wage is w=p = ³y, and the goods market clears when
5y = y1+y2 (the labor market clears by Walras’s law). The assumption ³ < 1=2
implies that the competitive equilibrium has ﬁrms producing at full capacity,
y1 = y2 = 1, with w=p = 2³ < 1. Now consider the Cournot–Walras equi-
librium without proﬁt feedback. From w=p = ³y and the consumer’s budget
constraint py = wy +¼ (¼ = ¼1 +¼2) follow the inverse demand functions (for
all ¼ > 0 and y = ` 2 (0;2]):
p((y;`);¼) = ¼
y(1 ¡ ³y) and w((y;`);¼) = ¼³
1 ¡ ³y :
Hence, ﬁrms’ proﬁt functions are ¼j = (p¡w)yj = ¼yj=(y1+y2), j = 1;2, which
are strictly increasing in yj, so that the unique Nash equilibrium coincides with
the competitive equilibrium. On the other hand, the original Cournot–Walras
equilibrium (with proﬁt feedback) depends decisively on the normalization rule.
To give an example, suppose ﬁrst that the wage is the num´ eraire, w = 1, so
that the Cournot–Walras equilibrium describes a duopoly. The inverse goods
demand is then p = 1=(³y), proﬁt functions are ¼j = (1=(³(y1 + y2)) ¡ 1)yj,
j = 1;2, so that the unique Nash equilibrium has y1 = y2 = min(1;1=(4³))
which diﬀers from the competitive equilibrium if ³ > 1=4. On the other hand,
suppose we ﬁx the price, p = 1, so that the Cournot–Walras equilibrium
describes a duopsony. The inverse labor supply is w = ³y, proﬁt functions are
¼j = (1¡³(y1+y2))yj, j = 1;2, and the unique Nash equilibrium is y1 = y2 =
min(1;1=(3³)) which now diﬀers from both the competitive equilibrium and
from the duopoly Cournot-Walras equilibrium if ³ > 1=3. 3
Example 2: Let I = 1, J = 2, L = 2 and assume that the single consumer
has no endowment and that his preferences are represented by u(x1;x2) =
v(x1) + v(x2), where v : IR+ ! IR is strictly increasing, strictly concave, and




(yj1;yj2) j 0 · yjj · 3=4; yji = 0 if i 6= j
o
; j = 1;2 :
With abuse of notation, write yj instead of yjj. The inverse demand functions










Thus, maximization of P1((y1;y2);¼)y1 over y1 2 [0;3=4] and given y2 > 0 is
equivalent to the maximization of y1v0(y1) = y1(1¡y1) which has the solution
y1 = 1=2. By symmetry, the best response of ﬁrm 2 is y2 = 1=2 and equilibrium
prices are p1 = p2 = ¼. Thus, the unique Cournot–Walras equilibrium without
proﬁt feedback diﬀers from the unique competitive equilibrium with production
6plans y1 = y2 = 3=4 and prices p1 = p2 = 2¼=3. Now consider the original
Cournot–Walras equilibrium (with proﬁt feedback). If good 1 is the num´ eraire
(p1 = 1), ﬁrm 1 produces at full capacity, y1 = 3=4, whereas the inverse demand
for good 2 is p2 = (1¡y2)=(1¡y1). Hence, proﬁt maximization of ﬁrm 2 yields
y2 = 1=2. Conversely, choosing good 2 as num´ eraire yields the Cournot–Walras
equilibrium y1 = 1=2 and y2 = 3=4. Finally, simplex normalization (p1+p2 = 1)
yields inverse demand functions pi = (1 ¡ yi)=(2 ¡ y1 ¡ y2), i = 1;2. It turns
out that the Cournot–Walras equilibrium is now symmetric and is given by
y1 = y2 = 2=3. This example shows that the Cournot–Walras equilibrium
without proﬁt feedback has an activity level which is below the competitive
equilibrium and which is also below the activity levels in the Cournot–Walras
equilibrium for three standard normalization rules. 3
5 Conclusion
We considered a general equilibrium model with oligopolistic competition be-
tween ﬁrms who know the objective competitive demand behavior of their
consumers, but who are ignorant of the proﬁt feedback on demand. The out-
come of this competition between ﬁrms with identical production technologies
is the competitive equilibrium. Thus, ﬁrms do not only take the proﬁt incomes
of their consumers as given, but they eﬀectively behave as if they were price
takers.
The number of oligopolists plays no role for this result (as it does not in the
classic Bertrand paradox). However, behind our assumption that ﬁrms ignore
the proﬁt feedback is the idea of a large number of islands (or sectors). Thus it
seems that it is the large number of sectors which is responsible for our result.
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